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RACE, DEATH, AND THE COMPLICITOUS MIND
Justin D. Levinson*

INTRODUCTION

Despite the historical racial imbalance in capital punishment,1 interdisciplinary scholarship has failed to investigate fully how the human
mind may automatically and systematically facilitate racial bias
against African-American defendants in capital cases. Considered in
the legal context, well-developed social science principles may help
reveal how people's automatic and unintentional cognitive processes
may either propagate racial disparities in the death penalty or serve as
a masking agent in covering up those disparities. As social science
research continues to demonstrate the power and pervasiveness of implicit racial bias in American society, 2 it is important to consider how
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Culture and Jury Project, William S. Richardson
School of Law, University of Hawai'i at M~noa. I would like to thank Andrea Lyon for inviting
me to participate in the DePaul Law Review Symposium, Media, Race, and the Death Penalty.
Al Brophy, Cynthia Lee, and Peter Levinson provided thoughtful critiques of earlier drafts.
David Hu and Kee Campbell provided outstanding research assistance. Dean Aviam Soifer provided generous summer research support.
1. See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) [hereinafter FROM LYNCH
AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002); RANDALL
(1997). See also Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in
Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2004) (stating that "between 1930 and 1982, African Americans
constituted between 10% and 12% of the United States population but 53% of those executed"
(citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Capital Punishment 1982, Aug. 1984, at
9)); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man's Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81
OR. L. REV. 15, 18 (2002) (noting that "the racially disproportionate application of the death
penalty can be seen as being in historical continuity with the long and sordid history of lynching
in this country").
2. See generally Brian Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlatesof Implicit Attitudes and SteMOBS]; STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY:
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW

reotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (2008) [hereinafter Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and

Correlates]. See infra notes 32-89 and accompanying text. As I discuss in Part II, these biases
have been demonstrated using a variety of methodologies. The most famous of these methodologies is the Implicit Association Test. See Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009). Before implicit social cognition research became prominent, legal
scholars often referred to "unconscious" bias rather than "implicit" bias, sometimes relying upon
Freudian conceptions of the unconscious. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331-36
(1987). Legal scholarship relying upon implicit social cognition now more frequently uses the
term "implicit" to describe attitudes, memories, and stereotypes that are outside of "conscious,
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automatic and unintentional cognitive processes may foster racial bias
in the legal system. 3 This Article pursues three goals related to this

endeavor: first, to introduce implicit social cognition research to
death penalty scholars and scholar advocates; second, to propose new
hypotheses that help explain why capital cases may be automatically

infused with racial bias and why research to date may cover up existing racial disparities; and third, to stimulate interdisciplinary collaboration and empirical examination of a wide range of social cognitive

factors in capital punishment.
Since the 1990s, social scientists have demonstrated that many
Americans harbor implicit racial biases that frequently conflict with
their self-reported racial attitudes. 4 These biases manifest automati-

cally and without conscious awareness in a variety of basic circum-

attentional control." Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 947 (2006); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497-1539 (2005) (explaining the foundations of scientific research on
implicit attitudes). Although the words "implicit" and "unconscious" describe similar processes,
some psychologists have cautioned against using them interchangeably. See Russell H. Fazio &
Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 303 (2003). In this Article, I generally use the term "implicit" rather
than "unconscious," except when discussing scholarship in which the authors specifically use the
term "unconscious."
3. These efforts should be combined with long-standing efforts to measure statistically overall
systemic inequalities. See, e.g., Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 Hous. L. REV. 807, 809 (2008); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the EmpiricalEvidence with
Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194 (2003) [hereinafter Baldus &
Woodworth, Race Discriminationin the Administration of the Death Penalty]; DAVID C. BALDUS
ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990)
[hereinafter BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE]; SAMUAL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989). See also David C.
Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discriminationand the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment:
Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411 (2004) [hereinafter Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment];
Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials:
AND DISCRIMINATION:

1976-1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1995); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:

RESEARCH INDICATES PAITERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES

(GAO/GGD-90-

57, Feb. 1990).
4. See Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds.,

2001) [hereinafter Banaji, Implicit Attitudes]; Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group
Attitudes and Beliefs From a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101 (2002) [hereinafter Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes]; Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring
Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) [hereinafter Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences];
Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem,
and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 15 (1995).
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stances, such as when people categorize information, 5 remember
facts, 6 and make decisions. 7 Furthermore, these automatic cognitive
processes work predictably and powerfully despite conflicting with
people's frequently egalitarian reports of their own racial attitudes.8
As legal scholars have become more aware of these powerful biases
and their implications for law and society, many have argued that the
new empirical understanding of discrimination warrants shifting legal
regimes. 9 Legal scholarship in a variety of areas now thoughtfully incorporates knowledge on implicit bias into disciplines such as employment law, 10 communication law,1 1 affirmative action, 12 and legal
5. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 181 (2001)

(finding that people can more quickly identify guns after having seen, but not noticed, flashing
photos of Black people); Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 510
(1991) (finding that simply seeing a member of a certain ethnic group can influence stereotypedriven word completion tasks); Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences, supra note 4,
at 1474 (showing that people are faster at grouping together, for example, Black names with
negative words than with positive words, relative to White names); Nosek et al., Pervasiveness
and Correlates,supra note 2 (reviewing the results of hundreds of thousands of these tests taken
on Project Implicit's website and elsewhere).
6. See generally Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking,
and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality]
(reviewing several of these studies and exploring how memory biases may function in legal decision making); Alison P. Lenton et al., Illusions of Gender: Stereotypes Evoke False Memories, 37
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (2001). See also C. Neil Macrae et al., Creating Memory

Illusions: Expectancy-Based Processingand the Generation of False Memories, 10 MEMORY 63,
64 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discriminationand the Implicit Association Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 368 (2007).
8. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1505 n.70 (explaining research on this process of "dissociation"
(citing Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989))).
9. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, BehavioralRealism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and DisparateTreatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1007 (2006); Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 348; Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 236-57 (2005); Kang, supra
note 2, at 1493-97. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1995). But see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the
Perils of Mindreading,67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1028, 1032-33 (2006) (arguing for caution in assuming that the results of the implicit association test apply in legal contexts).
10. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmakingand Unconscious
Discrimination,56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment DiscriminationLitigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481 (2005); Ann C. McGinley,
!Viva La Evoluci6n: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII. 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 415 (2000); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-CriticalAnalysis: The Casefor a
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999)
(arguing for a qualified evidentiary privilege to encourage unconscious-bias testing).
11. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1539-89.
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decision making. 13 Despite this meaningful progress, legal scholars in
other areas have yet to examine how stereotype-driven cognitive
processes may affect a broad range of laws and legal processes. 14 Interdisciplinary work identifying how law itself propagates bias is even
rarer. 15 One area of discourse in particular need of exploration is
16
death penalty scholarship.
Social cognition theory 17 can help generate new hypotheses relating
to race and capital punishment.' 8 This Article presents and develops

two preliminary hypotheses that apply social cognition theory to the
capital context: (1) Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, which posits
that the supposedly race-neutral death qualification of jurors unintentionally and automatically elicits implicit racial bias in the final jury
panel, and (2) Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis, which proposes that
complex empirical studies examining race and the death penalty may
unintentionally cover up racial bias because they rely on racially biased case facts.
12. See generally Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, FairMeasures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006).
13. See generally Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6; Page, supra note 9.
14. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1536-38 (describing a broad range of legal areas for future
research). Similarly, scholars who have already incorporated an understanding of implicit social
cognition should seek to tighten the nexus between the legal principles and scientific phenomena
they discuss.
15. See generally Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Juries: How "Legal Priming" Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059
(2005) [hereinafter Levinson, Suppressing Community Values]; Kang, supra note 2, at 1592 (challenging the FCC's policies encouraging more local news).
16. In the 2004 Race to Execution Symposium at DePaul University College of Law, Theodore
Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson began the examination of implicit racial attitudes in the context of the death penalty, and found that capital defense lawyers display implicit racial bias.
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit RacialAttitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1556 (2004).
17. Generally, the field of social cognition studies how people think about themselves and
others, "often using methods from cognitive psychology to investigate how the human mind
works." Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 354 (citing SUSAN T. FISKE &
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 2, 19 (2d ed. 1991)).
18. These new hypotheses, which focus on the automatic and often unintentional nature of
discrimination, are part of a broader effort to recognize the shared cultural responsibility for the
continuing racial disparities in criminal justice and beyond. See Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of "The Id, The Ego, and Equal
Protection," 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 959-60 (2008) (arguing that if scholars focus narrowly on
automatic cognitive processes, there is a risk that such scholarship will minimize cultural and
individual responsibility for racism); see also Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6,
at 417-18 (acknowledging that the only permanent solution for implicit racial biases is cultural
change). The hypotheses I present provide potential pathways for understanding how a culture
that has always discriminated has continued to do so in ways that are perhaps just as dangerous
but are now harder to detect. If these hypotheses are confirmed, they would not only call into
question the continued use of capital punishment, but also would reflect a discriminatory racebased cultural ideology that has infected legal processes. See generally Lawrence, supra note 2.
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Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis proposes that the death qualification process elicits implicit racial biases in most capital jurors. This
hypothesis is based on the social cognition concept of priming, a phenomenon that explains how even seemingly race-neutral conversations can elicit automatically racially biased cognitive processes in
jurors. This automatic activation results from both deep historical associations between capital punishment and race and the continuing
propagation of racial stereotypes in the media and American culture
generally.
Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis posits that influential studies examining racial bias in the death penalty have unintentionally covered
up racial bias against African-American defendants because these
studies rely upon sources of case information that are tainted by implicit bias. Social cognition studies have demonstrated that people
store and retrieve information in stereotype-driven ways, 19 and that
transmission of information from one source to another can unintentionally transform a non-biased story into a racially biased one. 20 As a
result of the unintentional fact-based errors that occur when racial stereotypes are present, even the most thoughtful and complex empirical
studies on race and capital punishment may use statistical techniques
that unintentionally mask racial bias.
Part II first introduces the science of social cognition and provides
several specific examples of empirical studies that explain how the
human mind automatically facilitates racially biased decision making. 21 In order to contextualize how these unintentional biases affect
legal discourse, Part II next describes how scholars in a variety of areas outside the death penalty arena have explored the close connection between implicit bias and the law. 22 Part III builds upon this
prior research in social cognition and the law, and introduces two new
hypotheses: Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis 23 and Racial Bias
Masking Hypothesis. 24 These hypotheses, although preliminary and
still in need of empirical exploration, examine first how the death
qualification process may itself bias capital jurors against AfricanAmerican defendants, and second, how implicit biases that affect the
perception, description, and later recording of case facts may serve to
cover up disparities based on the defendant's race. Part IV briefly
19. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 376-78 (describing this process).
20. See GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 65-68 (Russell & Russell 1965) (1947).
21. See infra notes 26-89 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 90-134 and accompanying text.

23. See infra notes 135-219 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 220-273 and accompanying text.
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discusses potential pathways for further exploration and concludes
that focused interdisciplinary collaboration will provide the most
meaningful path for progress in understanding the complexities of
25
race and the death penalty.
II.

IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNIION OUTSIDE AND INSIDE OF LAW

Understanding how people process and store information, categorize data, and make decisions is central to understanding decision
making in any legal context. In capital cases, little is known about the
cognitive processes whereby prosecutors, judges, and jurors make decisions. 26 In particular, very little is known about how attorneys',
judges', and jurors' automatic and unintentional cognitive processes
influence the way they think about case facts, defendants, aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, verdict, and punishment. 2 7 Investigat25. See infra notes 274-277 and accompanying text.
26. There have been quite a few studies of decision making in the death penalty setting, but
these studies tend not to have focused on implicit cognitions. See, e.g., Robert M. Bohm, Capital
Punishment in Two Judicial Circuits in Georgia: A Description of the Key Actors and the Decision-Making Process, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1994); Sally Costanzo & Mark Costanzo,
Life or Death Decisions: An Analysis of Capital Jury Decision Making Under the Special Issues
Sentencing Framework, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1994); see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Race and
the Victim: An Examination of CapitalSentencing and Guilt Attribution Studies, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 533 (1998) (describing a variety of studies both in capital and non-capital contexts).
27. Several legal scholars have alluded generally to the ways in which "subconscious" or "unconscious" biases may affect various aspects of capital trials. Most of these projects, however, do
not explicitly connect psychological theory and research to their claims. As discussed in Part IV
infra, these articles might be a good place to start when initiating empirical interdisciplinary
collaborations. See, e.g., Lucy Adams, Comment, Death by Discretion: Who Decides Who Lives
and Dies in the United States of America?, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 381, 389-90 (2005) (stating "a
white prosecutor may-consciously or subconsciously-perceive a crime to be more 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman' if it is alleged to have been committed against a
white victim, and if the outrage of the community and its desire for vengeance is palpable");
Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth
Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2083, 2094-2106 (2004) (reviewing several areas where unconscious discrimination may manifest, including the extreme deference give to prosecutors); Rory K. Little, What
Federal Prosecutors Really Think: The Puzzle of StatisticalRace Disparity Versus Specific Guilt,
and the Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591, 1599-1600 (2004) (considering
the "unconscious race empathy" that white prosecutors might have with white defendants or
white victims); Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective
Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARv. BLACKLErTER L.J. 127, 140-41
(2003) (proposing that it "is likely that unconscious racism influences a prosecutor even more
than it affects others."); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor'sPerspective: Race of
the DiscretionaryActors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1819 (1998) (alluding to unconscious biases
produced due to similarities between prosecutors and victims); see also Stephen B. Bright, Will
the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: InternationalNorms, Discrimination, Arbitrariness,and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1, 12-15; Angela J.
Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13,
18 (1998); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
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ing the connection between social cognition and legal decision making
is important in any legal case, but the stakes make it crucial in capital
cases. Although there are few efforts to connect implicit social cognition and the death penalty, 28 other legal scholarship can inform a social cognition based critique of the death penalty.
This Part first discusses a selected few social cognition projects that
29
may not be known to death penalty scholars and scholar-advocates.
Beyond the two hypotheses proposed in this Article, understanding
social cognition research may help death penalty scholars and scholaradvocates generate their own hypotheses. 30 The empirical studies described in this Part underscore two basic themes of implicit social cognition: first, the human mind makes unintentional, but powerful and
biased, associations based on gender, race, and ethnicity; and second,
these automatic associations are meaningful, and influence decision
making and behavior. After describing these studies, this Part turns to
existing legal scholarship on social cognition, highlighting legal scholarly work that may serve to stimulate theory development and collaboration in the capital context. 31 These legal-theory-based projects
demonstrate that understanding the workings of the human mind is an
important ingredient in achieving justice.
A.

Automatic Associations, Bias, and the Human Mind

Implicit social cognition researchers investigate how cognitive
processes operate "without conscious awareness or conscious control
but nevertheless influence fundamental evaluations of individuals or
groups. ' 32 As Anthony Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger describe, "the science of implicit cognition suggests that actors do not
always have conscious, intentional control over the processes of social
perception, impression formation, and judgment that motivate their
1016, 1016-17 (1988). See generally Julian A. Cook, Jr. & Mark S. Kende, Color-blindness in the
Rehnquist Court: Comparing the Court's Treatment of Discrimination Claims by a Black Death
Row Inmate and White Voting Rights Plaintiffs, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 815 (1996).
28. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 16, at 1556.
29. For detailed summaries of scholarship discussing implicit bias and the law, see Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6; Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1073-75 (reviewing
studies that document racial bias in hiring behavior and medical diagnoses); Kristin A. Lane et
al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 427,444 (2007) (summarizing
scholarship in implicit social cognition). See generally Kang, supra note 2; Christine Jolls & Cass
R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006).
30. For more on scholar advocates and political lawyers, see Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race
Praxis: Race Theory and PoliticalLawyering Practicein Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 821, 833-34 (1997).
31. See infra notes 90-134 and accompanying text.
32. Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1064; see also Fazio & Olson, supra note 2.
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actions. '3 3 In the 1990s, social scientists began to discover more fully
the complex pattern of automatic cognitive networks that people harbor. To learn how these networks function systematically, predictably,
and largely outside of people's conscious awareness, psychologists devised and tested several different valid methodologies. This Section
briefly describes a few of the reliable ways that social scientists have
measured people's implicit 34 cognitions. 35 These studies show first
that people harbor automatic attitudes and racial stereotypes that frequently deviate from their explicitly stated beliefs and, second, that
36
these implicit associations and stereotypes predict people's behavior.
1.

Ease of Stereotype Activation: Word Games and Identifying
Objects

Researchers have demonstrated the ease and power of stereotype
activation by showing how simply seeing a stereotyped group member
can activate a person's negative ethnic stereotypes related to that
group. 37 In one simple and elegant study, participants watched a
video in which a research assistant held cue cards containing word
fragments. 38 All participants watched identical videos, except that
half of the participants saw a video in which the research assistant was
Asian and half of the participants saw a video in which the research
assistant was Caucasian. 39 In the video, the assistant held cue cards
containing incomplete words, including words that were potentially
stereotypic of Asians, such as "RIE," "POLIE," "SORT," and
"SY." ' 40 Participants were asked to generate as many word completions as possible for each card during a fifteen-second period. 41 Results of the study showed that simply seeing an Asian research
assistant was enough to activate ethnic stereotypes of Asians. Participants who watched a videotape with an Asian assistant completed
33. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 2, at 946.
34. See Fazio & Olson, supra note 2, at 303 & n.1 (discussing the inexact use of the terms
"implicit" and "unconscious" in social science literature, and suggesting that scientists might
instead use the term "indirect").
35. See infra notes 37-89 and accompanying text.
36. See Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 368-69.
37. See Gilbert & Hixon, supra note 5. As Gilbert and Hixon point out, "[sitereotypes are
forms of information and, as such, are thought to be stored in memory in a dormant state until
they are activated for use." Id. at 509.
38. Id. at 510.
39. Id.
40. Id. The stereotyped completions of these words were RICE, POLITE, SHORT, AND
SHY.
41. Id.
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more stereotype words than participants who watched a videotape
42
with a Caucasian assistant.
Racial stereotypes, similar to the ones in the word completion
study, can be activated in just milliseconds. 43 Furthermore, research
demonstrates that even lightning-fast stereotype activation affects task
performance in racially biased ways. 44 A study by Keith Payne examined how merely showing participants a photograph of a White or
Black face for 200 milliseconds could affect the speed at which they
could subsequently identify weapons. 4 5 In the study, Payne showed
participants photos of Black or White faces followed immediately by
photos of objects. 46 The participants' only task, Payne told them, was
to identify the objects as quickly as possible when they were displayed
on the screen. 47 Payne also told participants that the flashing photograph of faces only served to alert the participant that a photograph of
an object was about to appear.48 Results of the study demonstrated
that when participants saw photos of Black faces immediately before
photos of guns, they were significantly faster at identifying the guns
49
than when they saw photos of White faces before photos of guns.
Similarly, when participants saw photos of White faces immediately
before photos of tools, they were significantly faster at identifying the
tools than when they saw photos of Black faces before photos of
tools. 50 In a follow-up study that measured the participants' error
rates rather than response speed when a time deadline was imposed,
Payne found that participants who saw Black faces before photos of
tools were more likely to misclassify the tools as guns compared to
participants who saw White faces before photos of tools. 5 1 Taken together, Payne's studies show that racial stereotypes can be elicited automatically in a number of milliseconds, and that these stereotypes
can affect the speed and accuracy of meaningful object classification
tasks.
42. Id. In this study, the researchers also tested how cognitive busyness affects stereotype
activation. The comparison reported above (for purposes of simplicity in describing the concept
of stereotype activation) only focuses on participants in the non-cognitive busyness condition.
Interestingly, the researchers found that cognitive busyness inhibits stereotype activation, but
increases its application once it has been activated. Id. at 512.
43. Payne, supra note 5.
44. Id. at 184-85.
45. Id. at 184.
46. Id.
47. Id. The objects consisted of guns and non-gun objects (the non-gun objects were hand
tools, such as a socket wrench and an electric drill).
48. ld.
49. Payne, supra note 5, at 185.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 189.
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Stereotype Primes: Test Taking, Walking Speed, and Beyond

Similar to the studies on stereotype activation, priming studies
demonstrate the simplicity and power of stereotypes on decision making. Priming describes "the incidental activation of knowledge structures, such as trait concepts and stereotypes, by the current situational
context.152 Simply put, priming studies show how causing someone to
think about a particular domain can trigger associative networks related to that domain. 53 Activating these associative networks, which
can include stereotypes, can affect people's decision making and behavior, often without their conscious awareness.
Some of the most famous priming experiments have studied the effect of racial, ethnic, and gender stereotypes on students' test-taking
performance. For example, Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson first
identified the concept of "stereotype threat" by priming college students in test-taking situations. 54 Steele and Aronson primed Caucasian and African-American college students by asking them to identify
their race just before they took a test. 55 The researchers found that
such a simple priming task had profound effects on African Americans' test performance. African-American participants took longer to
answer questions and achieved lower overall scores relative to Caucasian participants, but only when they were primed. 56 Thus, Steele and
Aronson found that priming a participant's racial constructs related to
the self likely implicated a complex relationship between AfricanAmerican identity and negative stereotypes relating to ability. They
called this phenomenon "stereotype threat."
In a related study, Steele and Aronson found that stereotype threat
could be elicited even by indirectly priming the racial stereotype. 57 In
this study, when they told half of the participants that the test results
would be used to evaluate performance but did not ask participants to
identify their race, they found results similar to those obtained when
they primed race directly: African-American students in the indirect
prime condition performed worse than Caucasian students in the same
condition, whereas African-American and Caucasian students per52. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and
Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 230 (1996).

53. Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, which is introduced and discussed, infra Part Ill,
relies
upon the concept of priming to explain how death qualification automatically primes racial stereotypes related to the death penalty. See infra notes 135-219 and accompanying text.
54. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 799 (1995).
55. Id. at 806.
56. Id. at 807.
57. Id. at 799.
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formed similarly in the non-prime condition. 58 This study demonstrates the ease and influence of indirect racial priming. Simply
priming a non-explicit but related stereotype, even without mentioning race, can cause profound results. Although it would not be intuitive to many that using race-neutral concepts can elicit powerful racial
stereotypes, social cognition research shows that priming can occur as
long as historical, cultural, or popular associations connect the concept
with a racial stereotype. In the case of stereotype threat, AfricanAmerican student participants associated the evaluation instruction as
implicating stereotypes relating to African Americans and intellectual
ability. Similarly, Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, which is introto argue
duced in Part III, relies upon the concept of indirect priming 59
biases.
and
stereotypes
racial
that death qualification primes
In a fascinating study that showed how non-conscious and indirect
priming of stereotypes can affect seemingly unrelated behavior, John
Bargh and his colleagues found that participants actually walked more
slowly after being subliminally primed with stereotypes of the elderly. 60 In this study, participants performed a scrambled-sentence task
that asked them to read groups of words and form their own sentences
using those words. 61 Half of the participants in the study read word
groupings that consisted of neutral words mixed with words associated
with the elderly, such as "worried," "wise," "stubborn," "helpless,"
and "bingo."' 62 The other half of participants read word groupings un63
associated with elderly, such as "thirsty," "clean," and "private.
After completing the sentence-creation task, participants were told
they had completed the study, thanked for their participation, and directed to exit through a bank of elevators down the hall.64 As soon as
participants exited the room, a confederate of the experimenter
started a hidden stopwatch and timed the amount of time it took for
the participants to walk the length of the corridor, ending at a strip of
tape placed on the floor nine-and-three-quarter meters from the start65
ing point.
58. Id. at 801.
59. See infra notes 135-219 and accompanying text.
60. Bargh et al., supra note 52, at 237.
61. Id. at 236 (citing T.K. Srull & R.S. Wyer, The Role of Category Accessibility in the Interpretation of Information about Persons: Some Determinantsand Implications, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1660 (1979)).

62. Id. Note that words related to slowness were not used in the study.
63. Id.
64. Id.

65. Id.
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As predicted, the study's results indicated that participants who had
been primed with elderly stereotype words took longer to walk down
the hall compared to participants who had been primed with neutral

words.66 Furthermore, participants in the elderly word prime condition reported almost no awareness of the stereotyped content of the
sentence creation task.6 7 This study builds upon the Steele and Aron-

son study by employing a different type of indirect priming and measuring its impact on a novel behavior. Here, merely seeing themed
but otherwise neutral words such as "wise," "worried," and "bingo,"
affected participants' own behavior, even without awareness of the

stereotype activation. Generally, these priming studies highlight the
susceptibility of the human mind to the interference of both direct and
indirect stereotypes. In the legal setting, it should not be surprising if
stereotype primes are frequently activated or if legal processes them68
selves act as primes.

3.

Reaction Time Measures: The Implicit Association Test

Thus far, this Section has explained the ease of automatically activating stereotypes and described how stereotypes, whether directly or

indirectly primed, can influence a broad range of decisions. The described studies are similar because they all activate implicit constructs,
such as stereotypes, and measure the effects of this activation. They

are different because scientists measure how the implicit constructs
manifest in different ways: in identifying language, in academic test
performance, and in walking speed. Each of these studies shows the

dynamic nature of implicit cognitive processes-processes that are important components of human decision making.
Within legal discourse, the most frequently discussed example of

implicit social cognition is the Implicit Association Test (IAT). 69 As
described elsewhere, the IAT
66. Bargh et al., supra note 52, at 237.
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 135-219 and accompanying text. See generally Levinson, Suppressing
Community Values, supra note 15 (arguing that simply placing citizens on juries automatically
changes the way they think and make decisions).
69. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1241, 1250, 1269-70 (2002); Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality,
supra note 6, at 356; Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 2, at 952-56; Kang & Banaji, supra note
12, at 1072; Page, supra note 9, at 237-38. See generally Kang, supra note 2 (thoroughly discussing the IAT and other implicit social cognition studies); Reshma M. Saujani, "The Implicit Association Test": A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 395 (2003). The IAT is not the only meaningful reaction time measure. Another
important line of studies measured reaction times in the shoot/no-shoot decisions of participants.
In these studies, often called "shooter bias" studies, participants typically participated in a video-
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pairs an attitude object (such as a racial group) with an evaluative
dimension (good or bad) and tests how response accuracy and speed
indicate implicit and automatic attitudes and stereotypes. In the
computerized version of the IAT, participants sit at a computer and
keyboard and are asked to pair an attitude object (for example,
Black or White, man or woman, fat or thin) with either an evaluative dimension (for example, good or bad) or an attribute dimension
(for example, home or career, science or arts) by pressing a response key as quickly as they can. For example, in one task, participants are told to quickly pair together pictures of African-American
faces with positive words from the evaluative dimension. The speed
at which the participants can pair the words together signifies the
strength of the attitude
(or in the case of attributes, the strength of
70
the stereotype).

Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald summarize, "when
highly associated targets and attributes share the same response key,
participants tend to classify them quickly and easily, whereas when
weakly associated targets and attributes share the same response key,
participants tend to classify them more slowly and with greater difficulty. ' 71 Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore add, "The ingeniously simple concept underlying the IAT is that tasks are performed
well when they rely on well-practiced associations between objects
'72
and attributes.
Scores of studies have found that people harbor implicit associations that are biased against stereotyped group members. 73 According
game-like experience, where they were told to shoot when they saw a person with a gun, but hit
the safety button when they saw a person with no weapon. These studies frequently showed that
participants were faster to pull the trigger when the armed person was Black and that participants were faster to hit the safety when the unarmed person was White. Participants also typically made more errors by "shooting" when the unarmed person was Black relative to White.
See Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentialsand the Decision to Shoot: The Role of Threat
Perception and Cognitive Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 122 (2006); Joshua
Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to DisambiguatePotentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1321 (2002); Payne, supra note 5,
at 185-86. Other authors have described shooter bias in more detail. See Levinson, Forgotten
Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 356-61; Kang, supra note 2, at 1525-28. Other reaction time
studies, such as the Go-NoGo Association Task (GNAT) are conceptually similar to the IAT, but
were designed for greater flexibility. See Brian A. Nosek & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Go/No-Go
Association Task, 19 Soc. COGNITION 625, 625 (2001).
70. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 355 (citing Greenwald & Banaji,
supra note 4, at 14-19, 14-19); Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 4, at 123-24; Greenwald et
al., Measuring Individual Differences, supra note 4, at 1466.
71. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 355 (quoting Nilanjana Dasgupta &
Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic
Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL.

800, 803 (2001)).

72. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 359.
73. See Anthony Greenwald et al., Understandingand Using the Implicit Association Test: III.
Meta Analysis of Predictive Validity, J. PERSONALInY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2009)
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to Brian Nosek and his colleagues, who reviewed hundreds of
thousands of IATs taken on the Project Implicit website and else-

where, the IAT has consistently shown that a majority of test takers
exhibit implicit racial bias 74-and other, non-racial biases-on a variety of measures. 75 For example, sixty-eight percent of participants
demonstrated an implicit preference for "White people" versus
"Black people" (or "light skin" versus "dark skin"), 76 seventy-five

percent of participants showed an implicit preference for "pro-abled

people" versus "disabled people," 77 and sixty-nine percent of partici-

pants showed an implicit preference for "thin people" versus "fat
78
people.
IAT results are both compelling and meaningful. Research has
found that implicit associations and stereotypes, measured by the IAT,

predict discriminatory decision making and behavior. 79 For example,
a 2007 study by Rudman and Ashmore tested whether the IAT pre-

dicted discrimination in economic decision making.80 In that study,
student participants first took a series of IAT tests, including those
testing negative stereotypes related to Jews (relative to Christians)
and Asians (relative to Whites). 81 On a separate occasion, the same
participants completed a survey designed to test economic discrimination.8 2 Participants were told that their input was needed in determining how to administer a mandatory twenty percent budget cut to
university student organizations. 83 They were then provided a list of
current student organizations along with funding levels, and were
asked to allocate the new budget across the various groups. 84 The researchers then compared participant IAT scores with recommended

budget cuts. 85 The results of the study showed that scores on the ster-

[hereinafter Greenwald et al., Understandingand Using] (including over 100 studies in the metaanalysis); Nosek et al., Pervasivenessand Correlates,supra note 2.
74. In implicit social cognition, the word "bias" means "a displacement of people's responses
along a continuum of possible judgments." Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 2, at 950. "Response bias need not indicate something unwise, inappropriate, or even inaccurate." Id.
75. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates, supra note 2.
76. Id. at 17. These results aggregated IATs testing Black versus White and Dark Skin versus
Light Skin.
77. Id. at 19.
78. Id.
79. Rudman & Ashiore, supra note 7, at 359. See generally Greenwald et al., Understanding
and Using, supra note 73.
80. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 363.
81. Id. at 363-64.
82. Participants had no reason to believe that the two studies were connected. Id. at 364-65.
83. Id. at 364.
84. Id. at 365.
85. Id.
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eotype IAT predicted economic discrimination. 86 Specifically, "people who associated minority group members with negative attributes
and majority group members with positive attributes were also likely
to recommend budget cuts for the target minority group's student organization. '87 Rudman and Ashmore's study adds to the literature
demonstrating the connection between implicit racial bias and biased
decision making and behavior. A meta-analysis of IAT studies concluded that IAT scores predicted a variety of behaviors, such as vot88
ing, consumer choice, and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores.
The meta-analysis also found that when measuring prejudice and stereotypes, the IAT, compared to self reports, served as a better predictor of hiring decisions, verbal and non-verbal pro-social indicators,
and other behaviors. 89 Taken together, these studies demonstrate the
importance of investigating the connection between implicit cognitive
processes and legal decision making.
B.

Legal Applications of Implicit Bias Research

Legal scholars have begun to incorporate research on implicit social
cognition into legal discourse. Since the 1990s, scholars have discussed social cognition work in several areas of legal discourse, with
employment discrimination law emerging as the most frequent venue
for discussions of implicit racial bias and implicit gender bias. This
Section describes some of the more focused examples of scholarship
linking social cognition and law, with the purpose of orienting a noninterdisciplinary audience to the breadth of this discourse. 90 Before
doing so, however, it must be acknowledged that based upon the numerous areas of law where social cognition theory has yet to be explored, this emerging interdisciplinary work remains in its infancy. 91
86. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 368.
87. Id. at 367.
88. Id. at 360 (citing T.A. Poehlman et al., Measuring and Using the Implicit Association Test:
III. Meta-analysis of Predictive Validity (unpublished manuscript, 2004)); see also Greenwald &
Krieger, supra note 2, at 954 (discussing Poehlman and colleagues' meta-analysis and the IAT's
predictive validity generally).
89. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 360.
90. See infra notes 92-134 and accompanying text.
91. In various instances, courts have discussed implicit racial bias with a level of sophistication. See, e.g., Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 905-08 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Law review
articles have discussed this element of the Chin case. See Darren Seiji Teshima, A "Hardy Handshake Sort of Guy": The Model Minority and Implicit Bias About Asian Americans in Chin v.
Runnels, 11 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 122 (2006); Sara R. Benson, Reviving the Disparate
Impact Doctrine to Combat Unconscious Discrimination: A Study of Chin v. Runnels, 31 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 61 (2005). Despite the progress seen in individual cases like Chin, for
the most part courts have been hesitant to rely upon this research in published decisions. See
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Employment law scholarship on implicit bias shows how established
legal principles must be reexamined when new social science evidence
conflicts with the law. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits intentional discrimination in the workplace. 92 Under
the "disparate treatment" branch of Title VII analysis, an employee or

potential employee claiming discrimination must demonstrate that the
employer intended to discriminate based upon the employee's group
membership. 93 Proving such intent to discriminate was never easy,

but it has become harder as the nature of discrimination has
changed. 94 Finding evidence that an employer made discriminatory

remarks or wrote biased notes in a written employment evaluation,
for example, has become rarer and rarer. Until the 1990s, however,
the subjective intent standard in employment discrimination largely
remained unchallenged based upon psychological reality. With the

emergence of social cognition research, a compelling number of scholars have recognized that implicit bias, which many of these scholars
term "unconscious" discrimination, 95 likely operates in a variety of
employment contexts. Although courtroom arguments of implicit bias
have been met with mixed results, 96 scholars have increasingly called

97
for a judicial recognition of implicit bias in the employment context.

Linda Hamilton Krieger, for example, argued that the intent standard
98
should be changed to a causation standard.

Scholars have examined other areas of the law in light of social cognition theory, although with less frequency compared to employment

discrimination law. Discourse on legal decision making has, for example, examined how attorneys, judges, and juries may unintentionally
make a variety of decisions in racially biased ways. 99 I have previously
infra notes 129-133 and accompanying text (discussing a New Hampshire court's rejection of a
fair trial motion based on Banaji's testimony).
92. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 9, at 1009.
93. Id. at 1009-10.
94. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 9 (arguing that Title VII jurisprudence constructs discrimination inadequately to address subtle, often unconscious, forms of bias).
95. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 10, at 483.
96. Kee Campbell, Inferring Implicit Bias: Not Necessarily a Leap of Faith (May 1, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
97. Several employment discrimination scholars have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Tristin K.
Green, Work Culture and Discrimination,93 CAL. L. REV. 623 (2005); Hart, supra note 10; Lee,
supra note 10; Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: SituationalRacism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013 (2004); McGinley, supra note 10; Pollard, supra note 10 (encouraging
testing for unconscious bias in the employment context); Amy L. Wax, Discriminationas Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999).
98. Krieger, supra note 9, at 1242.
99. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 347. See generally Page, supra
note 9.
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argued that judges and jurors automatically misremember case facts in
racially biased ways. 1°° When case facts are consistent with judges'
and jurors' explicit or implicit racial stereotypes-for example, the
stereotype that African Americans are aggressive-these judges and
jurors will find it easier to remember facts that are consistent with
these stereotypes. 10 1 To test this hypothesis, I conducted a simple empirical study designed to examine whether people misremember stereotype-consistent case facts in racially biased ways. 10 2 In the study,
participants read about a physical altercation that occurred after a bar
confrontation.1 0 3 All participants read the same facts, although some
read about an African-American actor, others read about a Native
Hawaiian actor, and still others read about a Caucasian actor. 10 4 After reading the story and being distracted by a short task, participants
were asked to identify whether certain facts had appeared in the story
they read. 10 5 Results of the study indicated that participants who read
about an African-American actor remembered that actor's aggressive
actions more frequently than participants who read about a Caucasian
1 06
actor.
Other scholars have focused on how implicit bias may affect attorney decision making during jury selection. Because of the importance
of jury selection in capital cases, these projects have direct relevance
to death penalty scholarship. In an article that examined how attorneys use peremptory challenges, Antony Page argued that the peremptory challenge process provides a ready forum for implicit bias to
manifest. 10 7 Page posited that even well-intentioned attorneys may
use their peremptory challenges in implicitly biased ways. 10 8 An empirical study by Samuel Sommers and Michael Norton tested a similar
hypothesis and found that study participants who acted as lawyers
consistently made race-neutral explanations for striking jurors even
when the study was designed so that the only difference between potential jurors was race.10 9 Adding credibility to these two projects in
100. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 350.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 394-95.
103. Id. at 394.
104. Id. Participants were randomly assigned to the three different conditions based on actor's race. The race of these actors was identified explicitly in the stories. Id. at 394-95.
105. Id. at 350.
106. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 350.
107. See Page, supra note 9, at 160.
108. Id.
109. Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-NeutralJustifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 261, 269 (2007).
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the area of capital cases, an empirical study by Theodore Eisenberg
and Sheri Lynn Johnson found that even capital defense attorneys, a
group of people who would be expected to resist racial bias, systematically displayed implicit racial bias when they took race IATs. 110
One of the first major projects exploring implicit social cognition
and law together examined the potentially harmful effects of Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) policies that favored local news
broadcasts.1"1 After outlining the FCC policies favoring local news as
part of the "public interest," Jerry Kang connected these policies to
implicit racial bias, and argued that local news acts as a "Trojan
Horse" that spreads biases rapidly to unsuspecting viewers. 112 Kang
meticulously linked this claim to implicit social cognition, and introduced legal scholars to studies psychologists had been developing over
the previous decade."1 3 Recognizing that the impact of social cognition spreads beyond communication law, Kang called for broad research agendas incorporating social cognition into law and policy, as
well as for increasing interdisciplinary collaborations. 1 4
Kang later joined Mahzarin Banaji, one of the creators of the IAT,
to provide new perspective on the affirmative action debate. 15 Recasting the affirmative action debate in terms of implicit bias and a
concept they called "behavioral realism," 116 Kang and Banaji argued
that the pervasive nature of implicit biases demonstrates that inequality is alive and well. Relying upon a wide range of studies in implicit
social cognition, Kang and Banaji claimed that taking "fair measures"
(a term they preferred to use instead of "affirmative action") might
one day help to disable the powerful effects of implicit racial bias in
society. 117 For example, one "fair measure" would be to hire more
"countertypical exemplars," people who are typically underrepresented in certain positions." 8 Hiring a countertypical exemplar
might mean hiring a female construction worker or a male nurse. 119
Kang and Banaji specifically connected their suggested fair measures
110. Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 16, at 1556.
111. Kang, supra note 2, at 1497.
112. Id. at 1553-54.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1536-39, 1591-92.
115. Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1065.
116. According to Kang, "behavioral realism" refers to "a new school of thought" in which
"legal analysts, social cognitionists [and more] ... cooperate to deepen our understanding of
human behavior generally and racial mechanics specifically, with an eye toward practical solutions." Kang, supra note 2, at 1591-92.
117. Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1078.
118. Id.at 1105.
119. Id.at 1109.
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with implicit social cognition research on "debiasing.' 'a20 Research
has shown that exposing people to countertypical exemplars can at
21
least temporarily reduce implicit bias.'
Scholars of the death penalty have sometimes discussed the ways in
which implicit bias might manifest in capital cases. 122 Although these
projects typically have not specifically connected implicit bias to decision making in death penalty cases, they have proposed a variety of
hypotheses worthy of investigation. Specifically, there appears to be a
convergence of interest among commentators that focuses on prosecutors as perpetrators of biased decision making. Jeffrey Pokorak, Rory
Little, Scott Howe, Lucy Adams, and Yoav Sapir have all asserted that
implicit biases among prosecutors may lead to racial disparities in capital cases. 123 Specifically, Pokorak claimed that similarities between
prosecutors and victims may lead to unconscious bias and racially disproportionate prosecutorial decisions. 124 Little termed this similarity
1 25
between prosecutors and victims "unconscious race empathy."'
Howe pointed out that extreme deference to prosecutors heightens
the stakes for prosecutors' unconscious biases.' 26 Adams asserted that
prosecutors' judgments of aggravating factors may specifically relate
to prosecutors' unconscious biases. 12 7 Finally, Sapir argued that un12 8
conscious bias likely affects prosecutors even more than others.
These scholars and others have generated meaningful hypotheses relating to implicit bias and the death penalty. The next step, as Kang
and others have argued more generally, is for interdisciplinary collaborations to empirically examine their claims.
Despite the early stage of research combining social cognition and
death penalty discourse, one indicator of interdisciplinary progress in
capital cases has been expert witness testimony on the IAT and its
possible effects in capital trials. In a 2008 New Hamphire pre-trial
hearing, Banaji testified that implicit racial bias might make it impossible for a Black defendant (who, in that case, was accused of murder120. Id. at 1111. Debiasing refers to the process of using interventions to reduce or eliminate
implicit biases. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 345-46; see also Kang,
supra note 2, at 121; Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1111.
121. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1561.
122. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
123. Most of these commentators use the word "unconscious" to describe the bias.
124. Pokorak, supra note 27, at 1819.
125. Little, supra note 27, at 1599-1600.
126. Howe, supra note 27, at 2096.
127. Adams, supra note 27, at 389-90.
128. Sapir, supra note 27, at 140.
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ing a White police officer) to receive a fair trial. 129 According to a
newspaper account of the testimony, "Judge Kathleen McGuire asked
Banaji ... 'Can a black defendant get a fair trial in New Hampshire
because of the largely white population we have?' . . . 'I want to say
yes,' Banaji said. 'But I know too much to say yes."' 130 She then
referred to the compelling results of the IAT and other implicit social
cognition research she had presented to the court on racial bias.1 31
Despite Banaji's testimony, Judge McGuire rejected the defense's
pre-trial motion and ruled that implicit bias in society did not prohibit
the particular defendant from getting a fair trial.1 32 Judge McGuire
wrote: "[T]hese studies concerning implicit racial bias do not establish
that any such bias will infect this case. Preliminarily, only one unpublished dissertation has linked IAT scores with mock jurors' individual
decisions, and no studies have examined the IAT in jury deliberations
in real trials. ' 133 This rejection of the alleged connection between implicit bias and a particular defendant's right to a fair trial highlights
the need for the development of new interdisciplinary theories that
apply social cognition specifically in the capital context. 134 The next
Part proposes two areas where social cognition theory may help develop a more focused understanding of implicit bias in the context of
capital punishment.
III.

NEW HYPOTHESES:

SOCIAL COGNITION AND THE

DEATH PENALTY

This Part introduces two hypotheses that apply social cognition theories directly to the death penalty context. It first discusses Death
129. Melanie Asmar, Professor: Racism Will Mar Trial, CONCORD
available

at

MONITOR,

Apr. 15, 2008,

http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080415/FRONT

PAGE/804150335.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Special Report: Addison CapitalMurder Trial Set to Begin, WMUR, Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.wmur.com/addisontrial/17514509/detail.html#-.
133. Order (Defendant's Motion to Bar Death Penalty No. 25) at 18, New Hampshire v. Ad-

dison, No. 07-S-0254 (N.H. Super. Ct. June 5, 2008).
134. This statement is also true for non-capital cases. Implicit associations and stereotypes
must be investigated in contexts that will prove more relevant using standards of traditional legal
analysis. Striving for this type of relevancy, a few legal scholars used the approach of critiquing
very particular aspects of the law in light of psychological research. See generally Kang, supra
note 2 (focusing specifically on communications law); Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided:
How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore PsychologicalReality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49
How. L.J. 1 (2005) (focusing on criminal law's mens rea requirement); Justin D. Levinson &
Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort
Law's Actual Cause and ForeseeabilityInquiries, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 195 (2004) (examining tort law in light of cultural psychological knowledge).

2009] RACE, DEATH, AND THE COMPLICITOUS MIND

619

Penalty Priming Hypothesis, and then explores Racial Bias Masking
Hypothesis. Before proceeding, it must be cautioned that these hypotheses are preliminary and have not yet been empirically examined.
Future research should pursue these hypotheses further.
A.

Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis

Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis proposes that death qualification, instead of providing a fair and meaningful system of empanelling
capital jurors, systematically elicits implicit racial bias in capital jurors.
As proposed, Death Penalty Priming works as follows: when jury venire members are "death qualified," the supposedly race-neutral line
of questioning acts as an indirect prime that triggers stereotypes of
African Americans, including criminality, dangerousness, and guilt.
These largely implicit stereotypes, which most Americans likely possess, 135 become activated during the death qualification process, and
subsequently affect the way jurors process information, deliberate,
and render verdicts when African-American defendants are on trial.
To understand Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, one must consider what happens in the minds of jurors during the death qualification process. 136 One might assume that jurors grapple with their
feelings about life, death, and justice, and rely on their personal
morals, values, and perceptions of civic responsibility. 137 These intu135. Data on the IAT, for example, thus far indicates that most American participants who
have been tested display implicit racial stereotypes. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying
text.
136. See, e.g., Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the
Death-QualificationProcess, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984).
137. These intuitive assumptions also underlie scholarship and cases focusing on the ways in
which death qualified jurors differ from excludable jurors. Research has shown, for example,
that because of differing values, the death qualification process tends to create juries that are
more Caucasian, more male, and more likely to convict. See, e.g., Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualificationand Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46-48 (1984); see also Richard Salgado, Tribunals Organized to Convict:
Searching for a Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror Death-QualificationProcess in United States v.
Green, 2005 BYU L. REV. 519, 530-31; William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and
Conviction Proneness: The Translationof Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 109
(1984); Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries' Bias and the Benefits of
True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ ST. L.J. 769, 784-85 (2006) ("The death qualification process today
still seats juries uncommonly willing to find guilt, and uncommonly willing to mete out death.
'Capital jurors hold disproportionately punitive orientations toward crime and criminal justice,
are more likely to be conviction-prone, are more likely to hold racial stereotypes, and are more
likely to be pro-prosecution."'); Salgado, supra note 137, at 520 (summarizing, "Thanks to deathqualification, 'capital juries are more likely to be white, older, predominantly male, Protestant,
and less educated than other criminal juries, and than the society from which they were picked."'
(citing David Lindorff, Aiming for a Conviction, NATION, at http://www.thenation.com/doc.
mhtml?i=20020513&s=indorff20025O2 (May 2, 2002))).
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itions, however, rely only on inquiries into the juror's conscious cognitive processes, and are therefore incomplete. A more complete
inquiry requires asking what happens in jurors' non-conscious minds
during death qualification. Instead of focusing only on explicit values

and beliefs, one must ask: What cognitive associations are being
formed automatically? What stereotypes are being indirectly triggered? One possibility worth pursuing is the hypothesis that death
qualification activates predictable, meaningful, and racially biased implicit cognitions in a majority of empanelled capital jurors.
This Section's preliminary exploration of Death Penalty Priming
Hypothesis pursues four related topics that help explain why the process of death qualifying jurors might unintentionally trigger racial stereotypes. This Section first briefly summarizes the death qualification
process. 138 It then explores how the death qualification process, compared to voir dire alone, alters the way people think and make deci-

sions. 139 It then investigates how indirect primes, such as the
seemingly race-neutral death qualification process, can activate racial
stereotypes. 140 Next, it addresses the issue of why death qualification
primes race in particular. 141 Finally, it explores whether the death

penalty prime, once activated by death qualification, can affect the
way jurors process information and make decisions. 142
1.

Death Qualification: A Quick Summary

Death qualification is "the process by which prospective jurors are
questioned at voir dire regarding their attitudes toward the death penalty.'

43

Prospective jurors may be excused for cause if they would

not convict a defendant who might receive the death penalty "regardless of the evidence,"'
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

44

or "would not consider death as a possible

See infra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 148-153 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 154-173 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 212-219 and accompanying text.
Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understandingthe Language of Death Qualifica-

tion, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 677 (2002).

144. Id. As the Supreme Court has stated, "A 'death-qualified' jury is one from which prospective jurors have been excluded for cause in light of their inability to set aside their views
about the death penalty that "would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their]
duties as [jurors] in accordance with [their] instructions and [their] oath."' Buchanan v.
Kenucky, 483 U.S. 402, 407-08 n.6 (1987) (alteration in original) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980))). The prosecutor may
remove such potential jurors according to the guidelines set out in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968), as refined by the decision in Wainright v. Witt. As Susan Rozelle explains:
Some people oppose the death penalty so fervently that they would go to almost any
length to avoid contributing to a death sentence. If their opposition is so strong that
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sentence regardless of the circumstances of the crime. ' 14 5 Although
empirical evidence has indicated that the death qualification process
results in juries that are more conviction prone, more likely to impose
the death penalty, and are less racially diverse, to date the Supreme
Court has rejected challenges to its use based on these empirical findings.1 46 As Justice Rehnquist reasoned for the majority in Lockhart v.
McCree:
"Death Qualification," unlike the wholesale exclusion of blacks,
women, or Mexican-Americans from jury service, is carefully designed to serve the State's concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply the law
to the facts 1of47the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a
capital trial.
Death qualification thus involves questioning jurors about their attitudes related to the death penalty, their willingness to convict a defendant who could potentially be executed, and their willingness to
consider sentencing the defendant to death. Although the Court has
assumed that asking jurors questions about the death penalty serves as
a legitimate way to determine jury excusals, it is possible that asking
jurors these seemingly race-neutral questions evokes a complex network of related cognitive associations. The Subsections that follow
explore this possibility.
2. Death Qualification Changes the Way Jurors Think
It may not be intuitive that death qualification temporarily changes
the way jurors think and make decisions. Yet studies that specifically
focus on death qualification have already demonstrated that people
exposed to the death qualification process make different decisions as
they are unwilling to risk any possibility that someone may be sentenced to death, they
are what are known as 'nullifiers.' These are individuals who would refuse to convict of
a death-eligible crime despite evidence at trial convincing them beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt on that score.
Rozelle, supra 137, at 775-76; see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986). There are
additional, though less common circumstances, that would warrant the excusal of a juror for
cause. For example, the Supreme Court has held that jurors who would always vote to impose
the death penalty may be excused for cause. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992).
145. Rozelle, supra note 143, at 677.
146. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). It is worth noting that unlike challenges to
death qualification based on differences between the venire and the empanelled jury, Death
Penalty Priming Hypothesis posits that the final members of the empanelled jury (rather than
only the excluded venire members) have had racial bias triggered.
147. Id. at 175-76. Justice Rehnquist did not consider or address the possibility that the death
qualification process itself causes the juries to be unable to impartially apply the law to the facts
of the case.
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a result of it.148 In a 1984 study, Craig Haney examined the "process
effects" of death qualification and hypothesized that death qualification "may predispose [jurors] to receive and interpret evidence in certain ways, and influence the verdict and sentencing decisions they may
be called upon to make. 1 49 In Haney's empirical study, participants
who were jury eligible citizens of California viewed videotapes of a
voir dire in a supposed murder trial. 150 Half of the study participants
watched a voir dire that included a thirty-minute segment of death
qualification, and the other half watched a voir dire that included no
death qualification. 15' After watching the videotapes, all participants
completed a questionnaire asking them about the trial.
Results of the study showed that participants who watched death
qualification answered questions differently than participants who
watched no death qualification. 152 More specifically, compared to
participants who only watched voir dire, participants who watched
death qualification were more likely to predict that the defendant
would be convicted of first-degree murder and receive the death penalty, more likely to predict that the prosecutor, defense attorney, and
judge believed the defendant to be guilty, and more likely to predict
that the prosecutor and judge had personal attitudes that favored the
death penalty. 153 Overall, these results showed that viewing a death
qualification altered the way the participants thought about major elements of the trial. Although Haney's study relied on videotaped
death qualification, and thus did not death qualify the participants
themselves, the study is nonetheless compelling. It demonstrates that
death qualification generates clear process effects: it affected the way
participants thought about the case, the evidence, and the participants
in the legal process. Haney's study, however, did not examine race in
the context of death qualification. The next inquiry, then, should be
to ask whether death qualification, other than changing the way jurors
think generally, indirectly triggers jurors' racial attitudes and
stereotypes.

148. See Haney, supra note 136.
149. Id. at 122.
150. Id. at 124. The videotapes were reenactments conducted in a courtroom by experienced
attorneys who relied upon facts from an actual murder trial. Other attorneys then reviewed the
videotapes and confirmed their realistic nature. Id. The jurors in the trial consisted of both jury
eligible citizens and confederates of the researcher. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 126.
153. Id. at 126-27.
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3. Indirect Primes Can Activate Racial Stereotypes
Death qualification may activate jurors' implicit racial stereotypes
by indirectly priming racial constructs. 154 This Subsection will first
briefly recap how priming works and then explain how indirect primes
can activate racial stereotypes. "[P]riming refers to the process by
which recently activated information about a group (e.g., stereotypes)
is used in making subsequent judgments of group-related stimuli. This
information is part of an associative network of related schemas that
are linked in memory. ' 155 When meaningful stimuli are primed, simple exposure to them elicits a network of related associations, even
though the participant may be entirely unaware that there has been a
prime at all. Priming studies thus show that "[m]ere exposure to...
aspects of a group stereotype itself can be sufficient to activate stereo1 56
typic associations, often without attention or awareness."
When examining the hypothesis that death qualification primes racial stereotypes, it is important to emphasize that stereotypes can be
indirectly primed. After all, death qualification requires that jurors
are asked not about race, but about their attitudes related to the death
penalty. Part II explained two studies that demonstrated how indirect
priming can activate related stereotypes. First, Steele and Aronson's
study showed that simply telling participants that a test was evaluative
of ability primed racial stereotypes of African Americans relating to
intelligence.1 57 Similarly, Bargh and his colleagues' study demonstrated that simply having participants read elderly stereotype words
like "wise," "worried," and "bingo" activated the unrelated elderly
stereotype of slowness and even caused participants to behave according to that stereotype.1 58 There are two more indirect prime examples
that support the claim that asking someone about the death penalty
generally can prime concepts that are associated with the death pen154. Recall that Part II introduced the concept of priming. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
155. Travis L. Dixon & Keith B. Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and Dangerous Black Criminal, 35 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1555, 1556 (2005). For a discussion of stereotypes, memory, and racial bias in legal
decision making, see Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6.
156. James D. Johnson & Sophie Trawalter, Converging InterracialConsequences of Exposure
to Violent Rap Music on Stereotypical Attributions of Blacks, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.

PSYCHOL. 233, 233 (2000). Interestingly, these stereotypic associations can become activated
"regardless of [a person's] level of prejudice or personal endorsement of the stereotype." Id. at
236.
157. See Steele & Aronson, supra note 54, at 798.
158. See Bargh et al., supra note 52, at 237.
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alty. 159 The first of these examples follows up Steele and Aronson's
stereotype threat priming study by using entirely different indirect
primes, and the second investigates how priming indirect and non-aggressive stereotypes of African Americans, like athleticism, will nonetheless prime stereotypes of African-American hostility.
Follow-up studies of stereotype threat have shown that it can be
elicited even by using more indirect (proxy) primes. Margaret Shih,
Todd Pittinsky, and Nalini Ambady used an indirect method of priming student-participants' ethnic identity, but found similarly powerful
results. 160 In that study, the researchers asked Asian-American female participants to fill out questionnaires prior to taking a math
test. 1 61 Some of these questionnaires asked the participants about
their roommate and dormitory living situations (this condition was designed to prime gender identity), while others received questionnaires
asking them about their family, including asking what languages were
spoken at home, and how many generations of their family had lived
in the United States (this condition was designed to prime ethnic identity). 162 Results of the study showed that this method of indirect prim163
ing significantly affected the participants' test performance.
Participants who had their Asian identity primed performed best on
the test, while participants who had their female identity primed per64
formed worst on the test.'
A study by Patricia Devine found that subliminally priming some
racial stereotypes, such as lazy and athletic, activated other unrelated
racial stereotypes of African Americans, such as hostility. 165 Devine
used a visual priming task that required participants to identify the
location of quickly flashing projected words. The location of the
words was evident, but the words flashed so quickly and were masked
159. This Subsection only asserts that the death penalty can be an indirect prime for associated concepts. The next Subsection explains why the death penalty primes racial stereotypes.
See infra notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
160. Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative
Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. Sci. 80 (1999).

161. Id. at 81.
162. Id. A third group received questionnaires asking them about their telephone and cable
television service. This condition was designed not to prime ethnic or gender identity. Id.
163. Id. at 82. As in the other studies described, the participants were unaware that they had
been primed. Id. at 81.
164. Id. at 81. Participants who were not primed for ethnicity or gender performed second
best. Id.
165. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 9 (1989) (citing J.C. Brigham, Ethnic Stereotypes,
76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 15 (1971)).
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166
such that participants only unconsciously recognized their content.
The flashing words were coded so that, even without participants' conscious awareness, racial stereotypes were activated. 167 The flashing
words included category words that the experimenters associated with
African Americans, such as "Blacks" and "Negroes," and stereotype
words that the experimenters also associated with African Americans,
such as "poor" and "athletic. '168 After the priming was accomplished,
participants read a story about a person engaging in ambiguously hostile behaviors-such as demanding money back from a store clerkand were asked to make judgments about the person engaging in
these behaviors. 169 The results of the study indicated that participants
who were primed with more stereotyped words judged the actor's ambiguous behavior as more hostile than participants who were primed
with fewer stereotyped words. 170 As Devine summarized, "the automatic activation of the racial stereotype affects the encoding and interpretation of ambiguously hostile behaviors for both high- and lowprejudice subjects. ' 17 1 Although traits such as "lazy" and "athletic"
are unrelated to the trait of "hostile," the stereotype congruity between the primed stereotypes and the trait of hostility made partici172
pants more likely to judge a behavior as hostile.
Applied to the death qualification context, these priming studies
show that in order to prime racial stereotypes in jurors, one need not
do so directly with those particular stereotypes. So long as the prime
is connected to the relevant stereotype through an associative network
of stereotypes, it can become activated. 173 The next Subsection pursues the question of why discussions of the death penalty during death
qualification trigger racial stereotypes.
166. Id. The researchers confirmed that participants did not immediately recognize the content of the words. Id.. The mask referred to was a series of jumbled letters that appeared immediately after each stimuli word.
167. Id. Devine used the same priming procedure previously used by Bargh and Pietromonoco. See John A. Bargh & Paula Pietromonaco, Automatic Information Processingand
Social Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented Outside of Conscious Awareness
on Impression Formation, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 437, 441 (1982).

168. See Devine, supra note 165, at 9-10.
169. Id. at 10.
170. Id. at 11-12.
171. Id. at 11.
172. Id. at 12. These associations appeared to operate entirely implicitly, as results of the
study were not related to participants' explicit racial prejudices.
173. It is also important to note that in Devine's study, as in the other studies previously
described, the prime was activated prior to the presentation and encoding of social information,
and yet still affected judgments of that social information. This initial priming, followed by presentation of information requiring judgment, mirrors the process of death qualification and the
subsequent trial.
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Why Death QualificationPrimes Race

Now that it is established that indirect primes can trigger racial stereotypes of aggression and hostility, it must be inquired specifically
whether the death qualification process primes similar racial stereotypes. If people do not automatically associate the death penalty and
race, the Death Penalty Prime will not harm any particular group.
The inquiry into whether people automatically associate the death
penalty and race requires examining the history of racial disparities in
the death penalty, as well as studies that demonstrate the racialized
portrayal of crime and the death penalty in the media.
a.

Historical Relationship between Race and the Death Penalty

History demonstrates that if there is one salient theme related to
the death penalty-other than death itself-that theme is race. 174 According to Charles Ogletree, Jr. and Austin Sarat, the death penalty
has been "a tool that has been used, throughout history, to oppress
racial minorities, and specifically, African-Americans. '' 175 Stuart Banner described two ways in which the death penalty has been used
throughout American history as a tool of oppression: by defining capital crimes unequally based on race and reinforcing the racial hierarchy through the manner of executions. 176 The first tool of oppression,
defining crimes unequally based on race, refers to colonial and early
state penal codes that listed specific capital crimes for African-American defendants. There are numerous examples. In New York, a slave
convicted of attempted murder or attempted rape was specifically eligible for the death penalty. 177 South Carolina targeted slaves and
"free Blacks" in a law that provided death as the sentence for burning
or destroying grain or commodities.1 7 8 Georgia made it a capital offence for slaves or free Blacks to strike Whites twice, or once if it
179
caused a bruise.
The second tool of oppression Banner described, reinforcing racial
hierarchy through the manner of executions, refers both to the way
174. See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS, supra note 1; BANNER, supra note 1; KENNEDY, supra

note 1.
175. FROM LYNCH MoBs, supra note 1, at 3.

176. Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical Perspective,in
FROM LYNCH MOBS, supra note 1, at 96, 97.

177. Id. at 98. Banner described several statutory schemes specifically identifying slaves as
eligible for the death penalty. He also noted that preambles to statutes contained legislators'
beliefs that "noncapital penalties were not stiff enough to deter slaves from committing crimes."
Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.

2009] RACE, DEATH, AND THE COMPLICITOUS MIND

627

African-American defendants were put through painful and degrading
methods of execution, and to the way executions often included specific racial messages of racial subservience. 1 0 Common methods of
execution for convicted slaves and free Blacks included burning them
alive, and subsequently displaying the corpses in public places. Displaying of the corpse in a metal cage designed for viewing carried the
purpose "an extra dose of terror" directed at "other slaves in communities where crime had occurred." 181 In addition to the execution
methods themselves, the ceremonies surrounding the executions frequently incorporated messages of subservience. According to one
story retold by Banner:
[Alt the 1819 hanging of Rose Butler, a New York City slave convicted of setting fire to her owner's house, the Baptist minister John
Sandford directed his remarks to the black spectators ....
In this
inestimable privilege, our fellow citizens of color enjoy a mutual
share with us; and this unquestionably should dictate to them a correspondent spirit of gratitude and the practice of every social virtue.
It is therefore deeply to be regretted that persons of color should
either envy or attempt1 8 to
destroy the safety and comfort to which
2
we are justly entitled.
Banner argued that the history of the death penalty, which for centuries was used as "a means of racial control," continues to influence the
way people think about the death penalty. 183 He summarized, "When
we think about the death penalty, we think, in part, in race-tinged
pictures-of black victims lynched by white mobs, of black defendants
''184
condemned by white juries, of slave codes and public hangings.
This notion specifically supports an underlying claim of Death Penalty
Priming Hypothesis: asking prospective jurors to consider and discuss
the death penalty automatically triggers racial associations.
b.

Death, African-American Stereotypes, and the Media

No empirical studies have examined directly whether supposedly
race-neutral discussions of the death penalty activate racial stereotypes. However, research on the continuing media portrayal of African Americans as aggressive criminals, sometimes examined
particularly in coverage of death penalty cases, supports the argument
that when people think about the death penalty, they think about African Americans. As empirical evidence will demonstrate: (1) the
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 101-07.
Id. at 104.
Banner, supra note 176, at 101-02 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 97.
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media relies on African-American stereotypes when discussing death
penalty cases, (2) the stereotypicality of African-American defendants
is related to death penalty conviction rates; and (3) race-specific and
non-race-specific crime portrayals activate stereotypes of the aggressive African American, which in turn affect emotional reactions, policy judgments, and decision making.
In a compelling study, Phillip Goff and his colleagues showed that
newspaper coverage of death penalty trials included racial stereotypes
of African Americans. 185 The researchers reviewed newspaper coverage of murder cases in the Philadelphia area from 1979 to 1999.186
Employing a coding methodology, researchers compared the number
of times "bestial or sub-human" references were made in Philadelphia
Inquirer articles related to death penalty cases, and compared references for Black defendants versus White defendants. 18 7 As they hypothesized, the number of "ape-like" words used in cases with Black
defendants (approximately 8.5 mentions per article) was significantly
higher than in cases with White defendants (approximately 2.2 mentions per article). 188 Interestingly, the researchers also found a direct
relationship between the articles' "bestial or subhuman" content and
the trial outcome: Black defendants who were put to death were portrayed with a greater number of ape-like representations in articles
than Black defendants who were not put to death. 18 9 This study
powerfully demonstrates that even supposedly race-neutral portrayals
of death penalty crimes incorporate harmful racial stereotypes of African Americans.
Jennifer Eberhardt and her colleagues have also demonstrated the
strong association between racial stereotypes of African Americans
and the death penalty. 190 Using data from Baldus and his colleagues'
database of Philadelphia death penalty cases, the researchers examined the relationship between the stereotypicality of Black defendants' facial features and the trial outcome.' 9' Supporting the
contention that there is an inextricable link between stereotypes of
185. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 303 (2008).

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 304.
189. Id.; see also Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality
of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 383, 384 (2006)
(finding that in capital cases with White victims in Philadelphia, Black defendants who looked
stereotypically Black were more likely to receive the death penalty than Black defendants who
looked less stereotypically Black).
190. Eberhardt et al., supra note 189, at 384.
191. Id. at 383-84.
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African Americans and the death penalty, the researchers found that
Black defendants whose faces exhibited more stereotypically Black facial features received the death penalty significantly more than Black
92
defendants with less stereotypic features.'
Empirical studies have shown that when people have race-salient
associations between concepts, such as African Americans and crimes
of aggression, discussing one of these concepts in race-neutral terms
will nonetheless prime racial stereotypes. Travis Dixon and Christina
Azocar, for example, found that local news contributed to a "chronically accessible" stereotype of Blacks as criminals. 193 In two studies,
194
Dixon and Azocar examined the "chronic accessibility" hypothesis.
In both studies, participants watched a video that contained local news
stories of several murders. 195 Some participants watched videos that
portrayed White suspects, some watched videos that portrayed Black
suspects, and others watched videos that portrayed race-unidentified
suspects. 196 In the first study, the researchers found that heavy television news-watching participants who saw videos with race-unidenti97
fied suspects were more likely to support the death penalty.'
According to Dixon and Azocar, "Apparently, when exposed to a
number of unidentified suspects, heavy news-viewing participants
were more likely to apply a schematic representation of Blacks. This
schema increased support for the death penalty .. ."198
In the second study, the researchers found that participants who
viewed news stories featuring mostly Black suspects were more likely
to make later harsh culpability judgments of a race-unidentified criminal.' 99 The researchers interpreted these results to support their hypothesis of the chronic activation of stereotypes. 20 0 According to
Dixon and Azocar, in violent crime scenarios, race need not be specifically mentioned in order to activate racial stereotypes: "[A]fter exposure to a majority of Black criminals in the news, the Black criminal
192. Id. at 385. This finding was strongest when examining cases where victims were White.
Id.
193. Travis L. Dixon & Christina L. Azocar, Priming Crime and Activating Blackness: Understanding the PsychologicalImpact of the Overrepresentationof Blacks as Lawbreakers on Television News, 57 J. COMM. 229, 233 (2007).
194. Id. at 230.
195. Id. at 235-36. The videos were edited so that they contained seven murder stories and
eight human interest stories. Id. at 235.
196. Id. at 236.
197. Id. at 240.
198. Id. at 241 (internal citations omitted). The researchers also found that stereotypes of
Black laziness were activated. Id.
199. Dixon & Azocar, supra note 193, at 244.
200. Id. at 246.
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stereotype may become automatically activated and subsequently

used to make relevant judgments regarding both race and crime. '20 1
This conclusion supports the hypothesis of Death Penalty Priming:
simply asking jurors about their views of the death penalty can prime
racial biases against African Americans. 202
A study conducted by Frank Gilliam and Shanto Iyengar provides
more evidence demonstrating the inseparability of race and murder. 20 3 The researchers tested how participants remembered a local
news story they saw depicting a murder. 20 4 All participants saw the

same local news portrayal of a murder except for one element:
whether or not they saw a photo of the suspect. 20 5 The researchers
found that sixty percent of the participants who saw no suspect falsely
recalled having seen a photo of a suspect, and of those participants,
seventy percent falsely remembered seeing a Black suspect. 20 6 This

false memory effect can. be best explained by reference to what the
researchers call "scripts," story-based expectations relating to murderers. 20 7 This finding demonstrates that simply thinking about a murder
can trigger racially relevant constructs based upon stereotypes of African Americans.
The link between race and murder can even trigger heightened
emotional reactions in people learning about the murders. Travis
Dixon and Keith Maddox showed participants a fifteen-minute video
of local news, the relevant part of which was a twenty-two second

201. Id. at 232.
202. As I explain in note 207, this study could indicate that racial stereotype priming could
occur in non-capital cases.
203. Frank D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public,44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 560, 561 (2000). The results I discuss here
were part of a pre-test for a larger study.
204. Id. at 564.
205. One-third of the participants saw a photo of a White male, one-third of the participants
saw a photo of a Black male, and one-third of the participants saw no picture of a suspect at all.
Id. at 563.
206. Id. at 564.
207. Id. at 561. Interestingly, these story-based "scripts" are reminiscent of the way jurors
have been shown to think about cases. See Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment
Stories: Testing a Story-Mediated Model of Juror Decision-Makingin Civil Litigation, 27 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 29 (2003); Reid Hastie, The Role of "Stories" in Civil Jury Judgments, 32 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 227 (1999); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, PracticalImplicationsof Psychological Research on Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 90,
95 (1990); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of
Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 521 (1988).
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story about the murder of a police officer. 20 8 In the video, the researchers varied the race and skin tone of the perpetrator's photo,
which was shown for three seconds, and separately asked the participants to report on their television news watching habits. 20 9 The results indicated that participants expressed more emotional concern
about the murder when the suspect was portrayed as a dark-skinned
2 10
black man compared to a white man.
Taken together, these studies show that, among other things: (1)
the media incorporates African-American stereotypes when discussing death penalty cases; (2) the stereotypicality of African-American
defendants is related to death penalty conviction rates; and (3) both
race-specific and race-neutral crime portrayals activate stereotypes of
the aggressive African American, which in turn affect emotional reactions, policy judgments, and decision making. As a result, one might
predict that there is an implicit association between the death penalty
and race that becomes activated during the supposedly race-neutral
211
death qualification process.
5. Death Penalty Priming and Jury Decision Making
Once a prime has been activated, it can affect decision making and
behavior. In the context of the death penalty, priming racial stereotypes during death qualification can affect subsequent jury decision
making. This Article has discussed studies that have shown how priming can affect decision making and behavior. For example, Steele and
Aronson found that priming race in African-American students affected subsequent test performance. 2 12 Shih, Petinsky, and Ambady
found that indirectly priming ethnicity and gender in Asian-American
women similarly affected test performance.2 1 3 Bargh found that priming elderly stereotypes affected the speed at which participants
208. Dixon & Maddox, supra note 155, at 1561. In many jurisdictions, murdering a police
officer serves as an aggravating factor that can make a defendant death eligible. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(5) (1975); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(6) (2008).

209. Dixon & Maddox, supra note 155, at 1560-61.
210. Id. at 1562. Interestingly, this effect was related to the participants' television news viewing habits. Participants who frequently watched television news were more concerned about the
murder when they saw a dark-skinned black suspect than a white suspect. However, participants
who watched only a little television news did not display this bias. Heavy news viewers also
rated the victims of Black perpetrators more positively than victims of White perpetrators. Id. at
1563.
211. Although it is most likely that death qualification activates the Death Penalty Prime, it is
also possible that other parts of a capital trial (including eyewitness testimony, voir dire, and
more) might trigger implicit racial biases. As with Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, these
possibilities should be examined empirically.
212. Steele & Aronson, supra note 54, at 808..
213. Shih et al., supra note 160, at 82.
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walked. 214 Finally, Devine found that priming unrelated racial stereotypes, such as lazy and athletic, affected the way people interpreted
ambiguously hostile behaviors.2 1 5 An additional example of priming's
effects on decision making helps support the hypothesis that activating
racial stereotypes at trial will likely affect juror decision making. This
research has demonstrated that the stereotype of the aggressive and
violent African American can affect judgments of job qualifications,
disposition, and more.
James Johnson and his colleagues primed participants by playing
segments of either a violent or non-violent rap song.2 16 Participants
later read supposedly unrelated stories of ambiguous behavior and
were asked to make judgments about people in the stories. 21 7 Results
showed that participants who listened to the violent rap music, compared to other participants, judged a Black male's aggressive behavior
as caused by dispositional factors (for example, a violent personality)
rather than situational factors (for example, stress related to a relationship break-up). 218 Further, results showed that participants who
listened to the violent rap music were more likely than the other participants to judge a Black job applicant as less qualified for a job
requiring intelligence. 219 This study shows dramatically that racial
stereotype primes (here, rap music) can influence seemingly unrelated
judgments (here, job qualification) so long as they are broadly related
(both are stereotypes of African Americans). Taken in the context of
capital cases, if death qualification primes racial stereotypes, those stereotypes could affect juror decision making.
In sum, research on race, priming, and decision making supports the
hypothesis that the supposedly race-neutral process of death qualification primes racial stereotypes of African Americans. Further research
should continue to evaluate this hypothesis.
B.

Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis

Implicit racial bias may even affect the accuracy of the most rigorous studies of race and capital punishment. These studies use sophisticated statistical methods to evaluate the role of race in capital
214. Bargh et al., supra note 52, at 237.
215. Devine, supra note 165, at 9.
216. Participants in the control condition did not listen to music. Johnson & Trawalter, supra
note 156, at 239; see also Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133, 138-39 (2002).

217. Johnson & Trawalter, supra note 156, at 240-41.
218. Id. at 242-43.
219. Id. at 244.
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punishment, but typically make important statistical adjustments
based on information that may already have been tainted by racial
stereotypes. One basic finding of social cognition research is that the
human mind can unintentionally incorporate stereotypes into the way
people remember situations and tell stories. 220 If the case facts and
summaries relied upon in empirical studies of the death penalty already contain racial biases before statistical analysis begins, then the
statistical analysis relying on these facts can unintentionally mask racial bias. As a result, studies that find little or no effects of capital
mask disprodefendants' race on trial outcome may unintentionally
221
race.
defendants'
on
based
treatment
portionate
1.

Statistical Adjustments: Attempting to Equalize Culpability

Since the 1970s, David Baldus, George Woodworth, and other
scholars have conducted rigorous examinations of death penalty prosecutions and convictions in a variety of jurisdictions. 222 As their now
famous results consistently display, "[t]he race of the victim has a consistent and robust influence on capital punishment,"223 but "race-ofdefendant discrimination is not an inevitable feature of all postFurman death sentencing systems. ' 22 4 In the context of capital cases,
researchers have used a range of statistical methodologies and varying
220. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 381 (citing ALLPORT & POSTMAN, supra note 20, at 65-68); Richard L. Marsh et al., Gender and Orientation Stereotypes Bias
Source-Monitoring Attributions, 14 MEMORY 148, 157-58 (2006); Yoshihisa Kashima, Maintaining Cultural Stereotypes in the Serial Reproduction of Narratives, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 594, 594 (2000).

221. Similarly, even studies that find such disparities based on a defendant's race may be
diminishing the actual severity of these disparities.
222. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 3; Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discriminationin the Administrationof the Death Penalty, supra note 3; David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrarinessand Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis of the Nebraska
Experience (1971-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Arbitrarinessand
Discrimination];David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the PostFurman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death
Penalty]; BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3; GRoss & MAURO, supra note 3; Samuel
R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparitiesin Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984). See generally Lee, supra note
10 (analyzing several of these studies and discussing future research directions).
223. Phillips, supra note 3, at 814 (describing systematic studies conducted by Baldus and
Woodworth, as well as by the United States General Accounting Office); see generally Baldus &
Woodworth, Race Discriminationin the Administration of the Death Penalty, supra note 3; U.S.
GENERAL AccoUrrING OFFICE, supra note 3.

224. Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment,
supra note 3, at 1412-13.
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levels of statistical sophistication. 225 The least statistically sophisticated studies have used what Baldus and others called "unadjusted"
data. These studies have compared conviction rates based on the defendant's race without making systematic attempts to control for cul226
pability, the victim's race, and aggravating and mitigating factors.
Because relying on unadjusted data assumes that potentially confounding variables-everything other than the measured variablesare equal, the most statistically sophisticated studies have employed
adjustment methodologies, designed to make better comparisons between groups. 227 For example, Baldus and colleagues' studies of
Georgia, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and more, attempted to statistically
control for factors such as defendant culpability, as well as aggravating
and mitigating factors. 228 According to Baldus and Woodworth, the
purpose of adjusting data is to "minimize the risk that the influence of
race and defendant culpability will be confounded and lead to faulty
225. See Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discriminationin the Administration of the Death Penalty, supra note 3; Phillips, supra note 3, at 819-20.
226. In experimental studies, researchers can create functional equivalence between two
groups by randomly assigning study participants to two groups. See J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (2005). However, in non-random situations, such as when comparing
capital defendants, an assumption of equivalence cannot be made. Baldus and Woodworth give
the following examples of "unadjusted" studies, supra note 3, at 215-25: State v. Cobb, 663 A.2d
948 (Conn. 1995); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in
Illinois, 1988-1997,81 OR. L. REV. 39 (2002); Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of
Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty Sentences in California,32 JURIMETRICS 33 (1991);
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death
Penalty in Florida,43 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991); PEG BORTNER & ANDY HALL, ARIZONA CAPITAL
CASE COMMISSION, ARIZONA FIRST-DEGREE MURDER CASES SUMMARY OF 1995-1999 INDICrMENTS: DATA SET II RESEARCH REPORT TO ARIZONA CAPITAL CASE COMMISSION (2002);
MARY ZIEMBA-DAVIS & BRENT L. MYERS, INDIANA CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE APPLICATION OF INDIANA'S CAPITAL SENTENCING LAW: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR FRANK O'BANNON
AND THE INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Jan. 10, 2002) (on file with the Indiana Criminal Justice
Institute, Indianapolis, Indiana).
227. Phillips lists the following jurisdictions as those where "reasonably well-controlled" studies have been conducted: California, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Philadelphia, and South Carolina. Phillips, supra note 3, at
808 (citing David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discriminationand the Death Penalty:
An Empiricaland Legal Overview, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 501,
517-19 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003)). Reasonably well-controlled studies are those
"including statistical controls for 10 or more legitimate non-racial case characteristics." Id. According to Baldus & Woodworth, a significant amount of research "is not well controlled, and
the results appear to be very dependent on local politics, crime rates, public opinion about crime
and punishment, jury selection procedures, capital charging and sentencing processes, and the
presence or absence of measures developed to limit the risk of racial discrimination." Baldus &
Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, supra note 3, at
1419.
228. See generally BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3; Baldus et al., Arbitrariness
and Discrimination,supra note 222; Baldus et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty,
supra note 222.
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inferences about the impact of race on decision-making. ' 22 9 Thus, the
goal of making adjustments is to eliminate confounds by controlling
'230
"for legitimate case characteristics.
Empirical researchers who employ sophisticated adjustment methodologies must bear a heavy fact-finding burden, as case facts are crucial in statistically determining how one can compare theoretically
alike groups of cases. These researchers have relied on a variety of
fact sources, including media reports, pre-sentencing reports, supplemental homicide reports, trial records, judicial opinions, and more. A
2008 study of death penalty cases in Houston, Texas, by Scott Phillips
relied solely on Houston Chronicle newspaper accounts of murders to
determine the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the
murders examined. 23 1 Relying on Baldus and Woodworth's complex
framework for coding and adjusting statistics, Phillips systematically
coded the Houston Chronicle stories into facts that described the nature of the killings. 232 For example, Phillips classified whether the stories described the defendant using physical or mental torture (an
aggravating factor under Baldus and his colleagues' framework) or
whether they described provocation of the defendant (a mitigating
factor)..233 Baldus and colleagues have used a variety of fact-gathering
techniques, but have also sometimes relied upon media sources in deciding how to weigh aggravating versus mitigating factors. In their
study of Pennsylvania, for example, in addition to using various other
sources, Baldus and colleagues relied upon newspaper accounts to
234
supplement other factual sources.
229. Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discriminationin the Administration of the Death Penalty,
supra note 3, at 196. Because the researchers seek to test like cases against one another and then
measure for race effects, the purpose of the statistical adjustments are to equalize non-equal
facts. If White Defendant A has three aggravating factors and one mitigating factor, and Black
Defendant A has five aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, statistics can provide for a
hypothetical equalization of the White defendant case with Black defendant case, even if the
aggravating and mitigating factors are different. The problem, however, is that due to implicit
racial bias in the case facts, Black defendant cases may now contain erroneously high measures
of aggravating facts and erroneously low measures of mitigating facts relative to White defendant cases.
230. Id. at 197.
231. Phillips, supra note 3, at 825. Phillips described his methodology:
[N]ewspaper articles about each case were collected from The Houston Chronicle online archive (an average of 6.75 articles per case, for a total of more than 3,400 articles).
The aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each case were coded based on a list
drawn from Baldus and colleagues' research on race and capital punishment.
Id. (citing BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 526-35).
232. Id. (citing BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 526-35).

233. Id.
234. According to the authors, "newspaper accounts, obtained on-line, were often helpful."
Baldus et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty, supra note 222, at 1671.
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Not all of the studies that have employed adjustment methodologies
rely on media sources for case facts. Baldus and colleagues' study of
Nebraska, for example, did not rely on the news media for fact gathering. Instead, the researchers relied largely upon "pre-sentence investigation reports," which, according to the researchers, "include[] a
detailed description of the defendant that is generated by a probation
officer following a criminal conviction" and contain "a description of
the crime that is generated from the trial record, police reports, and
interviews with the defendant. ' 235 Michael Songer and Isaac Unah
used supplemental homicide reports 23 6 and court case reports to determine case facts.2 37 Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro relied almost
exclusively on supplemental homicide reports. 238 Regardless of which
particular sources of facts the researchers select, scholars recognize
that fact gathering is one of the most important stages of empirical
research. As Baldus and colleagues cautioned separately in several
articles, "a major challenge in this type of research is obtaining relia'23 9
ble data on the cases.
Empirical researchers, and most prominently Baldus and his colleagues, have explicitly recognized that even the most sophisticated
statistical analyses make assumptions that can later be challenged.
One goal in devising a study that measures anything complex, and certainly in designing a study that measures racial disparities in capital
cases, is to avoid ignoring data or variables that might change the results in a meaningful way. As Baldus and his colleagues explained,
one danger of overlooking relevant variables would be a distortion

of our comparative-excessiveness analysis because we incorrectly
estimated the relative culpability of the cases....

An omitted variable could also bias the results of our race-ofvictim and race-of-defendant analyses in both [studies] if the varia-

ble omitted from the analysis influenced the decisions of prosecutors and juries and if certain values of that variable 240
occurred more
frequently in one racial subgroup than in the other.
235. Baldus et al., Arbitrarinessand Discrimination,supra note 222, at 689.

236. Supplemental homicide reports are "local police agencies file with the Uniform Crime
Reporting section of the FBI." Gross & Mauro, supra note 222, at 49.
237. Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on
ProsecutorialDecisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina,58 S.C. L. REV. 161, 184-86

(2006).
238. Gross & Mauro, supra note 222, at 49.
239. Baldus et al., Arbitrarinessand Discrimination,supra note 222, at 689. It is worth noting
that other than the potential influence of implicit racial bias in the case facts, the methodology
employed by Baldus and his colleagues is impressive, sound, and convincing. Every reasonable
step was taken to avoid human error.
240. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 430.
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Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis proposes that implicit racial bias in
case facts may be such an omitted variable..
Baldus and colleagues also specifically noted the possibility of a "reporting bias." One reporting bias
might be a tendency by those who provided information to parole
board investigators to describe the circumstances of the white-victim and black-defendant cases in an aggravated direction. This bias
would cause such cases in our study to appear to be more aggravated than they actually were, thus reducing the observed race-ofvictim and race-of-defendant effects.241
Although Baldus and colleagues were likely referring to intentional
skewing of facts by prosecutors and law enforcement officers, this "reporting bias" could also describe an implicit bias that disproportionately includes stereotypes in the underlying case facts. More
specifically, if implicit racial bias affects the way case facts are perceived, remembered, told, retold, and recorded, these case facts may
systematically cause crimes involving African-American defendants to
appear more aggravated than they actually were. Such an unintentional "implicit aggravation effect" would cause later statistical analysis to mask or reduce racial disparities in case outcomes, because it
would falsely assume that African-American defendants committed
more aggravated crimes than they actually did.
2.

Stereotypes Bias Case Facts

There are two primary reasons why the underlying case facts relied
upon by researchers might be biased: first, facts are selectively enhanced by law enforcement officers and prosecutors to make
prosecutorial decisions seem reasonable in retrospect; and second,
these facts become skewed unintentionally due to.implicit biases in
the way witnesses, law enforcement officers, attorneys, judges, and
news reporters perceive, encode, store, retrieve, and transmit information. This Subsection briefly addresses the first possibility, and then
shifts to the second, social-cognition-based explanation.
a.

Intentionally Biased Facts

Micheal Radelet and Glenn Pierce have provided one explanation
that would account for racial bias in the underlying case facts. 242 They
claim that prosecutors may initially select certain cases they wish to
pursue for the death penalty, and then selectively enhance the way
241. Id. at 444-45.
242. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and ProsecutorialDiscretion in Homicide
Cases, 19 LAw & Soc'y REv. 587, 593 (1985).
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they discuss these cases, such that a later analysis would make the
decision seem justifiable.2 43 Radelet and Pierce summarize the
hypothesis:
[S]ome cases, which initially do not appear to be among the most
serious, are first selected for harsh treatment and then characterized
so as to appear similar to cases that were classified as most serious
from the time they entered the criminal justice process. The ability
of prosecutors or other criminal justice decision makers to develop
or minimize evidence in order to justify the results desired in particular cases may create an appearance of similarity among initially
dissimilar
cases that reach the later stages of the criminal justice
24 4
system.

Summarizing the importance of this hypothesis, Radelet and Pierce
state, "if the process of selectively developing or ignoring evidence in
cases is related to extra-legal factors, such as race, then this process
will help create the illusion of even-handed justice at later stages in
' 2' 45
the criminal justice system.
Radelet and Pierce pursued their hypothesis empirically by comparing facts presented in police reports to facts later discussed by
prosecutors:
If a comparison of the police description of a homicide with the
subsequent description of the same homicide in the court records
reveals differences that parallel differences in the racial characteristics of defendants and victims, then evidence suggesting selective
manipulation or amassing of evidence and racial bias would be
found. 246
Thus, Radelet and Pierce compared how prosecutors presented cases
in ways that were more or less serious than police had originally documented, and then tested whether these differences were related to the
race of the defendant or victim. Specifically, they focused on whether
or not police and prosecutors classified a defendant's actions in a murder case as being in the process of committing another felony. This
factor serves as an aggravating factor in most capital jurisdictions, and
can therefore lead to the death penalty. Results of their study demonstrated that prosecutors were more likely to "upgrade"-and less
likely to "downgrade"-the seriousness of the crime, relative to police
24 7
reports, in situations when Black defendants killed White victims.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 594.
247. Id. at 606.
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It further showed that such "upgrading" increased the probability of a
248
death sentence by twenty-two percent.
Radelet and Pierce's study supports the contention that the facts
underlying various studies of the death penalty may be biased. Many
of the facts relied upon by researchers, such as jury determinations,
court transcripts, judicial opinions, and pre-sentencing reports are
24 9
generated after the prosecutor has become involved in the case.
b.

Automatic and Unintentionally Biased Facts

Crucial case facts, such as descriptions of aggravating factors, may
also be racially biased, because automatic cognitive processes frequently work to incorporate racial stereotypes in the perception, encoding, storage, and transmission of factual information. This
unintentional transmission of stereotypes can take place easily, and
can affect everything from simple storytelling to media accounts of
murders. Taken together, social cognition studies indicate that the
factual sources underlying empirical studies of the death penalty may
contain already racially biased information.
i.

Propagation of bias in storytelling

A famous social psychological study on racial bias in storytelling
was conducted by Allport and Postman. 250 Their study elegantly demonstrates that people's minds can work automatically and in subtle
ways to incorporate incorrectly stereotypes of African Americans into
stories. In Allport and Postman's study,
participants viewed a picture of passengers on a streetcar (one of
whom was Black). In the picture, one White passenger holds a razor blade and the Black passenger is empty-handed. After viewing
the picture, participants were then asked to describe the picture to
other participants who had not seen the picture. As participants
told and retold the story to others, the story changed. After the
story had been retold several times, some participants reported that
the Black
passenger-not the White passenger-held a razor
25 1
blade.
More recent studies have followed up Allport and Postman's groundbreaking work, and have confirmed that stereotypes tend to be trans248. Radelet & Pierce, supra note 242, at 614.
249. Studies that rely primarily on reports of law enforcement officers, generated prior to
prosecutor involvement, would presumably avoid the problems that Radelet and Pierce discuss.
See, e.g., GRoss & MAURO, supra note 3, at 35 (relying on supplemental homicide reports pro-

vided by local law enforcement agencies to the FBI).
250. ALLPORT & POSTMAN, supra note 20.
251. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 831.
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mitted as stories are retold multiple times. Yoshihisa Kashima, for
example, found that when stories are retold by multiple individuals,
stereotype-consistent information tended to remain in the stories but
stereotype-inconsistent information tended to drop out. 252 Applied to
the context of capital cases, this phenomenon would tend to indicate
that the earlier stage in which the information is gathered, the fewer
stereotype-consistent errors it is likely to have. Practically speaking,
such a conclusion would mean that police reports and eyewitness accounts are less likely than court transcripts or pre-sentencing reports
to include racial stereotypes that are propagated through storytelling
transmission biases.2 53 It is worth noting, however, that by the time
factual sources such as court opinions and pre-sentencing reports are
generated, many of the underlying facts have been told and retold numerous times.
ii.

Encoding, storing, and retrieving stereotypes

In addition to biases caused by errors in storytelling, case facts may
be unintentionally biased due to memory errors. Social cognition research demonstrates that the human mind can automatically misremember facts in racially biased ways. These memory errors could
easily become incorporated into various descriptions of case facts that
researchers rely upon to make statistical comparisons. A study by
Alison Lenton and her colleagues found that stereotypes influenced
false memories. 254 That is, when stereotypes were present, people
could actually believe that they remembered something that never
happened. In their empirical study, the researchers presented participants with word lists that included female stereotypes, such as secre255
tary and nurse, and male stereotypes, such as lawyer and soldier.
After giving participants a brief distraction task, Lenton and her colleagues administered a recognition test. Results of this recognition
task indicated that participants often had false memories of having
seen gender-stereotyped words they had not seen, and "that these
false memories were elicited implicitly. '2 56 In fact, most participants
252. Kashima, supra note 220 at 601.
253. Other research, however, has demonstrated that eyewitness accounts, for example, are
themselves suspect, particularly when the eyewitness sees a perpetrator from another race. For a
discussion of "own-race bias," see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in
Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984). See also Christian A. Meissner & John C.
Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigatingthe Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic
Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3 (2001).
254. See Lenton et al., supra note 6, at 5.
255. Id.
256. Much of the language of this paragraph, including citations, is taken more or less verbatim from an earlier work. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 379.
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were completely unaware of the word lists' gender stereotype theme.
The researchers expressed concern that the implicit creation of stereotype-consistent false memories may help to explain the "self-perpetu'257
ating nature of stereotypes and their resistance to change.
Applied to the capital context, Lenton and her colleagues' study demonstrates that people can unwittingly and inaccurately recast situations to conform with stereotypes. In the capital context, it might be
possible that people responsible for transmitting case facts-such as
witnesses, law enforcement officers, and attorneys-could fail to accurately recall case information and unintentionally incorporate racial
biases into their recollections.
Part II described a project in which I argued that judges and juries
unintentionally misremember facts in racially biased ways. 258 Recall
that in that study, participants read short stories of facts relating to a
fight between men after a bar altercation. Results of the study
showed that participants who read about an African-American actor
were more likely to remember aggressive actions taken by the actor.259 Building on Lenton's study of false memories, this study demonstrates that the human mind can be quickly and automatically
influenced by stereotypes in subtle yet racially biased ways. If similar
biases influence the way facts are recorded and summarized prior to
their incorporation in empirical studies of the death penalty, then relying on those facts as accurate can lead to disproportionately biased
results.
These studies explain how errors in case facts may be generated
both from individuals misremembering stereotype-relevant information, and through the unintentional propagation of misinformation
through storytelling. These fact-based errors could affect the factual
sources underlying empirical studies of the death penalty.
iii.

Biased media reports

Because some empirical studies of the death penalty rely specifically on media sources, this Subsection focuses specifically on the media's role in mischaracterizing facts in racially biased ways. Empirical
studies have shown generally that the media systematically overrepresents African-American crimes, and specifically that the media
includes racial stereotypes in accounts of capital cases. Recall from
Part III.A that a study by Goff and his colleagues demonstrated that
257. Id. (quoting Lenton et al., supra note 6, at 12).
258. See generally Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6.
259. Id. at 350.
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media accounts of murders can be tainted by racial bias. 260 That study
found that PhiladelphiaInquirer stories contained a disproportionate
amount of "ape-like" and "bestial" references when describing death
penalty cases of African-American defendants, compared to stories
describing death penalty cases of White defendants. 261 In addition to
these findings of media bias in the factual and descriptive reporting of
death penalty cases, the study found a direct connection between the
news article bias (the ape-like representations) and the outcome (defendants put to death).
Other empirical studies confirm the deep connection between media fact reporting and the propagation of racial stereotypes, findings
that call into question certain results of empirical studies relying on
media sources for case facts. 262 Several studies have found that televi263
sion news overrepresents the criminality of African Americans.
Travis Dixon and Daniel Linz researched television news in the
greater Los Angeles area and compared news media coverage with
crime statistics. 264 The researchers aggregated television news coverage from several different channels, and undertook a systematic coding scheme designed to measure the portrayal of perpetrators based
upon race. 265 They found that African Americans and Latinos were
portrayed as lawbreakers, but that European Americans were portrayed as defenders of the law. When looking only at portrayal of
perpetrators in felonies, such as murder, African Americans were almost two-and-a-half times more likely to be portrayed as felons than
Whites. 266 Importantly, the overrepresentation of African Americans
as perpetrators existed even when accounting for arrest rates. 267 For
example, African Americans were portrayed as felons forty-four percent of the time, but accounted for only twenty-five percent of felony
arrests.

268

Other studies have found similar results. A study by Robert
Entman of local television in the Chicago area focused on the media's
260. Goff et al., supra note 185, at 302.
261. Id. at 304.
262. For a thorough discussion of how local news may serve to propagate racial bias, see
Kang, supra note 2.
263. Travis L. Dixon & Daniel Linz, Overrepresentationand Underrepresentationof African
Americans and Latinos as Lawbreakers on Television News, 50 J. COMM. 131, 132 (2000).

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 142.
267. Id. at 145.
268. Id. at 146.
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role in depicting African-American criminality.2 69 Entman's study,
which examined local news broadcasts over a fifty-five day period,
found that African Americans charged with crimes were more likely
than European Americans to be pictured "in the grip of a restraining
police officer" and less likely to be named. 270 Another study by
Daniel Romer examined Philadelphia local news coverage and found
that African Americans were more likely to be pictured as perpetrators than as victims. 271 Gilliam and Iyengar found that minorities accounted for a disproportionately high fifty-nine percent of suspects in
violent crime cases reported by Los Angeles news stations from 1996
to 1997.272 In light of these studies, one might ask whether empirical
studies that rely on the media for case facts are unintentionally including biased facts that serve to minimize or mask racial disparities.
Considered in the aggregate, social cognition research demonstrates
that implicit bias in case facts can skew statistical analysis in such a
way as to reduce or completely mask racial disparities. Because people misremember information and retell stories in automatically stereotyped ways, one can hypothesize that murder summaries might
contain factual errors that systematically increase the reported culpability and aggravated nature of African-American defendants' crimes.
Such fact-based errors would ultimately mean that despite researchers' good faith attempt to "control for legitimate characteristics,"
studies might be misaligning statistically. Such a misalignment would,
as Baldus and colleagues acknowledged, reduce observed race-of-de273
fendant effects.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The primary goal of this Article is to demonstrate the potential for
interdisciplinary collaboration in law and social science that will help
locate and understand how racial biases manifest at various stages of
269. Robert M. Entman, Blacks in the News: Television, Modern Racism and CulturalChange,

69 JOURNALISM Q. 341 (1992).
270. Dixon & Linz, supra note 263, at 133 (citing Entman, supra note 269, at 351).
271. Daniel Romer et al., The Treatment of Persons of Color in Local Television News: Ethnic
Blame Discourse or Realistic Group Conflict?, 25 COMM. RES. 286, 294 (1998).
272. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 203, at 562.
273. It must be noted that I am not an expert in the complex statistical models used by Baldus
and others. The purpose of this discussion is not to prove the absolute existence of error in some
of the most impressive interdisciplinary studies in history. Rather, the purpose of this discussion
is to advance a preliminary hypothesis grounded in social cognition theory that could help explain how even groundbreaking studies displaying massive societal inequality might even be
holding back the complete truth about racial discrimination in the death penalty. Perhaps an
understanding of social cognition in the context of these studies can help inform future methodology and statistical analysis.
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capital cases. The hypotheses proposed in this Article have theoretical grounding and empirical support and deserve further examination.
Yet, as is the nature of hypotheses, neither Death Penalty Priming
Hypothesis nor Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis has been tested empirically. Thus, this Article urges caution in relying upon the accuracy
of these hypotheses until they have been explored more systematically. For this reason, it is premature to discuss meaningful solutions
274
to the potential problems discussed in this Article.
However, a few concluding points should be made regarding the
continued need for interdisciplinary collaboration that combines law
and social science. Collaboration between legal scholars and social
scientists is needed now more than ever. 275 Despite tremendous col276
laborative successes in the capital context beginning in the 1970s,
avenues remain unexplored. Social cognition research in particular
provides opportunities to engage in thoughtful, targeted studies of various stages in the death penalty process. Research on priming, in addition to the particular hypothesis advanced in this Article, might
alone account for several novel hypotheses that have yet to be examined. In addition, many of the hypotheses previously asserted by
scholars of the death penalty have not yet been empirically explored. 277 The best hypotheses will likely come from advocates and
scholar-advocates engaged deeply in the struggle for racial justice in
criminal law and capital cases. The other articles in this Symposium
issue are therefore another great place to start.

274. Other projects discussing implicit bias in law have made a variety of arguments. These
arguments, applied to Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, could range from debiasing strategies
to abolition of the death penalty. See generally Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, (arguing for "fair
measures"); Page, supra note 9; Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6 (claiming that
the best solution is cultural change).
275. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Culture, Cognitions, and Legal Decision-Making,in HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION ACROSS CULTURES 423, 423-39 (Richard M. Sorrentino
& Susumu Tamaguchi eds., 2008) (summarizing social cognition, cultural psychology, and discussing a variety of legal projects in these areas).
276. See, e.g., Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 137; BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra

note 3.
277. For example, many legal scholars have focused on potential "unconscious" bias by prosecutors. See Radelet & Pierce, supra note 242.

